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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3231 
 ___________ 
 
 FLORENCE R. PARKER, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
PENNSTAR BANK, NBT; CITIMORTGAGE, Inc.; DAVID M. GREGORY, Esq.; 
JOHN DOE, burglar-agent; CADOZA LUMBER VALLEY COMPANY, Inc.; 
CARMEN VITALE, President; RAY JENSON, Log Buyer; MS. LYDA STERNS; SGT. 
BLACK; JOHN DOE & JANE DOE AFFIANT; JOHN NOLAN, Chief Assessor; ESQ. 
C. DANIEL HIGGINS; JOAN CAROL LANGSTON, Seller; MILFORD VALLEY 
ABSTRACT; FIRST PENN ABSTRACT; KATHY M. YOUNG; NATIONAL PENN 
BANK; ARROW HEAD ELECTRIC; BOBBY LEE; CREDIT COUNSELING 
CENTER; FIRST PENN ABSTRACT 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00490) 
 District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2011 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 8, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
2 
 
 Pro se appellant Florence Parker appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her 
amended complaint as a sanction for her failure to comply with discovery orders.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 Parker filed this pro se civil action in October 2008, naming as defendants 
Pennstar Bank, NBT; Pennstar’s attorney, David Gregory; and two of its employees, 
Kathy Black and LynDa Starnes.
1
  She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, 
and state law.  Her claims concerned events leading up to and including a foreclosure 
action on her home that the defendants successfully prosecuted in Pennsylvania state 
court; she alleged that she was the victim of a sprawling conspiracy that involved, in 
addition to the defendants, an unidentified burglar and an individual who purportedly 
backed out of an agreement to harvest trees on her property.   
 The parties sparred repeatedly during discovery.  As relevant here, on March 5, 
2010, a magistrate judge granted the defendants’ motion to compel and ordered Parker to 
provide the defendants with the following information:  (1) receipts for and explanations 
of certain damages that she claimed; (2) her federal and state tax returns for 2004–2008; 
(3) the names of her prospective witnesses; and (4) the name of the Pennstar employee 
                                                 
1
  Parker also named numerous other entities and individuals as defendants; 
however, she properly served only those defendants listed above, and the District Court 
therefore dismissed the action as to the other proposed defendants under Rule 4(m) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
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whom she allegedly contacted after obtaining a home equity loan.  Parker, however, gave 
the defendants only the names of her witnesses.  The defendants then filed a motion to 
compel Parker to supply the addresses of her witnesses so that they could be subpoenaed 
for depositions.  The magistrate judge granted that motion on April 13, 2010, and ordered 
Parker to provide her witnesses’ addresses by April 20, 2010, but Parker did not do so.  
Thus, the defendants filed two motions for sanctions:  one concerning Parker’s failure to 
comply with the March 5, 2010 order, and one concerning Parker’s failure to comply 
with the April 13, 2010 order.   
 The magistrate judge scheduled a hearing on the motions for May 25, 2010.  The 
defendants appeared and presented evidence in support of their motions; Parker failed to 
attend.  Subsequently, the magistrate judge recommended that Parker’s amended 
complaint be dismissed.  The District Court, after considering the factors prescribed by 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), approved and 
adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the case.  Parker then filed a 
timely notice of appeal.   
 We review the District Court’s order for abuse of discretion, Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007), and evaluate the Court’s 
exercise of discretion by examining how it balanced the factors set forth in Poulis.  These 
factors are (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary caused by the failure to comply with court orders; (3) a history of dilatoriness; 
(4) whether the conduct of the party was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 
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sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.  
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.   
 On appeal, Parker has not meaningfully challenged the District Court’s order.  
Instead, she devotes the bulk of her brief to asking us to reverse the state court’s 
foreclosure order.  Putting aside the question of whether the federal courts have the 
authority to consider the merits of such a claim, see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), it is simply 
irrelevant to the crucial issue of whether the District Court erred in dismissing her 
amended complaint.
2
 
On performing our own independent review of the Poulis factors, we conclude that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  Parker was proceeding pro se, and was 
thus fully responsible for her own conduct.  See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Further, Parker’s conduct prejudiced the defendants both by impeding their 
efforts to prepare their case and also by requiring them to file unnecessary motions to 
enforce the magistrate judge’s orders.  See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Parker also engaged in a pattern of dilatory conduct.  See Poulis, 747 
F.2d at 868.  As detailed above, she repeatedly ignored the defendants’ discovery 
requests, did not comply with the magistrate judge’s orders, and even failed to attend the 
                                                 
2
  The appellees filed a motion to strike Parker’s brief, and Parker responded 
with a motion to strike the appellees’ brief.  Both motions are denied.  We also note that 
in the District Court, Parker filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the Court 
denied.  Because Parker has not challenged that order on appeal, we will not consider it. 
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hearing that the magistrate judge scheduled.  (This was her second improper absence:  
she had also previously failed to attend a settlement conference.) 
We also agree with the District Court that Parker’s conduct was willful.  She 
flouted the magistrate judge’s orders, and offered only unpersuasive justifications for her 
conduct.  As the magistrate judge explained, ―[t]he plaintiff has since provided excuse 
after excuse for failure to comply with orders of the court.  The plaintiff is no longer 
credible.‖  We also observe that Parker seemed to engage in gamesmanship concerning 
legal mail:  she apparently refused to provide her address to the defendants and would 
accept messages only by email, but enabled certain email settings that (she claimed) 
occasionally prevented her from receiving messages sent by the defendants.  It was thus 
reasonable for the District Court to conclude that Parker had behaved willfully.  See, e.g., 
Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002).  
The final Poulis factor — the meritoriousness of the claims — also supports the 
District Court’s order.  While we express no opinion as to whether dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) or summary judgment would have been appropriate, we note that Parker relies in 
large part on conclusory statements and unfounded speculation.  These types of 
allegations are typically insufficient to state a claim.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  For example, many of her claims are premised on her allegation 
that ―John Doe‖ burglarized her home; however, beyond her conjecture, she has provided 
no basis to connect the burglary to any of the defendants.  Her RICO allegations are 
similarly ill-developed.  Moreover, certain defenses are also apparent:  for instance, 
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Parker has failed to allege that the defendants ―act[ed] under color of state law,‖ which is 
required for her § 1983 claims.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We thus find no error in the District Court’s 
conclusion that this factor also militated in favor of dismissal. 
In light of the fact that at least five of the six Poulis factors support the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint,3 we conclude that the Court did not 
abuse its discretion.  See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order dismissing Parker’s amended complaint.    
                                                 
3
  The District Court concluded that the fifth factor did not support dismissing 
the action because, while there was evidence that Parker had limited assets, it was not 
clear from the record that she would not be able to afford to pay a monetary sanction.  Cf. 
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263.   
